Boltzmann Brains and Possible Worlds

An assessment of the current status of the Boltzmann Brain (BB) Problem in the literature, and an analysis and critique of the many assumptions that go into the argument. I argue that if one is to take the BB Problem seriously, one must consider BBs in other possible worlds with experiences compatible with our world--of which there will be infinitely many, thus significantly worsening the problem. I then present a simple and intuitive argument demonstrating that in fact this problem is easily solved, showing that given one's experiences, it is overwhelmingly likely that one is not an other-worldly BB. This argument can then be applied to all BB scenarios more generally, making them closer to metaphysical possibilities (like a BIV- or evil demon-type sceptical scenario), and no longer as concerning as had previously been thought, even if we live in a BB-dominated cosmology.