Who is Rationalizing? On an Overlooked Problem for Kant’s Moral-Psychology and Method of Ethics

I critically examine the plausibility of Kant’s conception of rationalizing, a form of self-deception that plays a crucial role for Kant’s moral-psychology and his conception of the functions of critical practical philosophy. The main problem I see with Kant’s conception is that there are no theory independent criteria to determine whether an exercise of rational capacities constitutes rationalizing. Kant believes that rationalizing is wide-spread and he charges the popular philosophers and other ethical theorists with rationalizing. Yet, his opponents could, in turn, charge him with rationalizing and some theorist, namely, Act-Consequentialists, seem to be in an even stronger position to charge Kant with rationalizing than vice versa. In response, I propose standards that do not assume a specific normative theory and that become apparent when we look at clear-cut abuses of rationality. These standards of minimally decent reasoning can help us diagnose rationalizing. I develop these standards by looking at inadequate uses of rational capacities that should strike one as problematic regardless of the specific ethical theory one buys into. I emphasize that even an abuse of rational capacities can yield true results and that we can never tell from a single judgement that someone rationalizes. Rather, we must look for patterns.