A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

Paola Manzini; Marco Mariotti

doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8

A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

Paola Manzini^*, Marco Mariotti

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2725-2736
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	87
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8
Publication status	Published - Dec 2003

Bibliographical note

Copyright:
Copyright 2004 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Keywords

Multiperson bargaining
Regulation
Voluntary agreements

Access to Document

10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8

Handle.net

Persistent link

Cite this

@article{34185d3af7ab4cd9ba33fdcdda120421,

title = "A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements",

abstract = "We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.",

keywords = "Multiperson bargaining, Regulation, Voluntary agreements",

author = "Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti",

year = "2003",

month = dec,

doi = "10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8",

language = "English",

volume = "87",

pages = "2725--2736",

journal = "Journal of Public Economics",

issn = "0047-2727",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "12",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

AU - Manzini, Paola

AU - Mariotti, Marco

PY - 2003/12

Y1 - 2003/12

N2 - We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.

AB - We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a 'toughest firm principle' holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.

KW - Multiperson bargaining

KW - Regulation

KW - Voluntary agreements

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0142169882&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8

DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00137-8

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

AN - SCOPUS:0142169882

SN - 0047-2727

VL - 87

SP - 2725

EP - 2736

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

IS - 12

ER -

A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Access to Document

Handle.net

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this