Threat intervention with limited security resources is a challenging problem. An optimal strategy is to effectively predict attackers' targets (or goals) based on current available information, and use such predictions to disrupt their planned attacks. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic framework to address this challenge which encompasses the following three elements. First, we design a method to analyze an attacker's types in order to determine the most plausible type of an attacker. Second, we propose an approach to predict possible targets of an attack and the course of actions that the attackers may take even when the attackers' types are ambiguous. Third, a game-theoretic based strategy is developed to determine the best intervention approaches taken by defenders (security resources).
|Title of host publication||AAMAS'14: 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Paris, France, 05-09 May 2014|
|Number of pages||2|
|Publication status||Published - 5 May 2014|
- Security, Game theory