Abstract
We consider the evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative game on an adaptive network, where the strategies of agents (cooperation or defection) feed back on their local interaction topology. While mutual cooperation is the social optimum, unilateral defection yields a higher payoff and undermines the evolution of cooperation. Although no a priori advantage is given to cooperators, an intrinsic dynamical mechanism can lead asymptotically to a state of almost full cooperation. In finite systems, this state is characterized by long periods of strong cooperation interrupted by sudden episodes of predominant defection, suggesting a possible mechanism for the systemic failure of cooperation in real-world systems.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 93015 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | New Journal of Physics |
Volume | 12 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Research Groups and Themes
- Engineering Mathematics Research Group