A Methodology for the Characterisation of Leakages in Combinatorial Logic

Marco Martinoli, Guido Bertoni, Maria Chiara Molteni

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

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Abstract

Glitches represent a great danger for hardware implementations of cryptographic schemes. Their intrinsic random nature makes them difficult to tackle and their occurrence threatens side-channel protections. Although countermeasures aiming at structurally solving the problem already exist, they usually require some effort to be applied or introduce non-negligible overhead in the design. Our work addresses the gap between such countermeasures and the naïve implementation of schemes being vulnerable in the presence of glitches. Our contribution is twofold: (1) we expand the mathematical framework proposed by Brzozowski and Ésik (FMSD 2003) by meaningfully adding the notion of information leakage, (2) thanks to which we define a formal methodology for the analysis of vulnerabilities in combinatorial circuits when glitches are taken into account.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-281
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Hardware and Systems Security
Volume1
Issue number3
Early online date30 Nov 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Side-channel analysis
  • Hardware countermeasures
  • Glitches
  • Formal method

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