A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)

30 Citations (Scopus)
305 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Jim Joyce has presented an argument for Probabilism based on considerations of epistemic utility. In a recent paper, I adapted this argument to give an argument for Probablism and the Principal Principle based on similar considerations. Joyce's argument assumes that a credence in a true proposition is better the closer it is to maximal credence, whilst a credence in a false proposition is better the closer it is to minimal credence. By contrast, my argument in that paper assumed (roughly) that a credence in a proposition is better the closer it is to the objective chance of that proposition. In this paper, I present an epistemic utility argument for Probabilism and the Principal Principle that retains Joyce's assumption rather than the alternative I endorsed in the earlier paper. I argue that this results in a superior argument for these norms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)19-35
Number of pages18
JournalEpisteme
Volume10
Issue number1
Early online date25 Mar 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013

Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Projects

  • Accuracy and Epistemic Deference

    Pettigrew, R. G.

    1/10/111/07/12

    Project: Research

  • Cite this