A revenge problem without the concept of truth

Mark Pinder

doi:10.1002/tht3.168

A revenge problem without the concept of truth

Mark Pinder

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

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Abstract

The vast majority of putative solutions to the liar paradox face the infamous revenge problem. In recent work, however, Kevin Scharp has extensively developed an exciting and highly novel “inconsistency approach” to the paradox that, he claims, does not face revenge. If Scharp is right, then this represents a significant step forward in our attempts to solve the liar paradox. However, in this paper, I raise a revenge problem that faces Scharp's inconsistency approach.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	151-161
Number of pages	11
Journal	Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volume	4
Issue number	3
Early online date	13 Aug 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.168
Publication status	Published - 11 Sep 2015

Keywords

liar paradox
revenge
truth
Scharp
inconsistency approach
replacement

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KW - liar paradox

KW - revenge

KW - truth

KW - Scharp

KW - inconsistency approach

KW - replacement

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DO - 10.1002/tht3.168

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A revenge problem without the concept of truth

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Keywords

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