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A Survey of Logical Realism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages26
Early online date26 Aug 2019
DateAccepted/In press - 14 Aug 2019
DateE-pub ahead of print (current) - 26 Aug 2019


Logical realism is a view about the metaphysical status of logic. Common to most if not all the views captured by the label ‘logical realism’ is that logical facts are mind- and language-independent. But that does not tell us anything about the nature of logical facts or about our epistemic access to them. The goal of this paper is to outline and systematize the different ways that logical realism could be entertained and to examine some of the challenges that these views face. It will be suggested that logical realism is best understood as a metaphysical view about the logical structure of the world, but this raises an important question: does logical realism collapse into standard metaphysical realism? It will be argued that this result can be accommodated, even if it cannot be altogether avoided.

    Research areas

  • Philosophy, Logic, Metaphysics, Metaphysics of Logic, Logical Realism



  • Full-text PDF (Author’s accepted manuscript)

    Rights statement: This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Springer Netherlands at 10.1007/s11229-019-02369-5. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

    Accepted author manuscript, 275 KB, PDF document

    Embargo ends: 26/08/20

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