A Systems Approach for Assessing Non Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear nonproliferation efforts traditionally have focused on controlling the supply of proliferation-relevant technology, material, and expertise. As barriers to diffusion of all three have been lowered, there is increased acknowledgement of the need to reduce demand for such weapons, and, in cases where efforts to prevent proliferation have failed, the need to develop effective international responses. However, with few exceptions, approaches to nonproliferation have remained qualitatively the same over the last sixty years. In addition, many states whose active support is essential, view nonproliferation as primarily a U.S. issue and in some cases see U.S. military superiority as a more serious threat to their security than nuclear proliferation. Such states are often unresponsive to requests to strengthen their nonproliferation efforts. In this paper we develop a basic systems dynamics model of the process of proliferation against which nonproliferation strategies can be assessed. This basic model includes both processes of acquisition of nuclear weapons and processes that motivate states to seek nuclear weapons. Next we develop simple models of nonproliferation strategies and demonstrate how they impact the process of proliferation. We then offer observations about the relative impact of different strategies, given hypothetical initial and boundary conditions. Finally, we recommend additional work to improve the model and make it accessible to the nonproliferation community both for discussion and for testing hypotheses.