A "tragedy of the clubs": Excess entry in exclusive coalitions

Paola Manzini; Marco Mariotti

doi:10.1111/1467-9779.00091

A "tragedy of the clubs": Excess entry in exclusive coalitions

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We model club formation as a noncooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular type of collective inefficiency, namely, excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs." The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	115-136
Number of pages	22
Journal	Journal of Public Economic Theory
Volume	4
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00091
Publication status	Published - 2002

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Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

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10.1111/1467-9779.00091

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