A "tragedy of the clubs": Excess entry in exclusive coalitions

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We model club formation as a noncooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular type of collective inefficiency, namely, excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs." The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)115-136
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume4
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Bibliographical note

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