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Accuracy and the Credence-Belief Connection

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-20
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophers' Imprint
Volume15
Issue number16
DatePublished - Jun 2015

Abstract

Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concerned with the so-called Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. This argument begins with the claim that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence is its accuracy. It then shows that, however we measure accuracy, any non-probabilistic credences are accuracy-dominated: that is, there are alternative credences that are guaranteed to be more accurate than them. It follows that non-probabilistic credences are irrational. In this paper, I identify and explore a lacuna in this argument. I grant that, if the only doxastic attitudes are credal attitudes, the argument succeeds. But many philosophers say that, alongside credences, there are other doxastic attitudes, such as full beliefs. What's more, those philosophers typically claim, these other doxastic attitudes are closely connected to credences, either as a matter of necessity or normatively. Now, since full beliefs are also doxastic attitudes, it seems that, like credences, the sole source of epistemic value for them is their accuracy. Thus, if we wish to measure the epistemic value of an agent's total doxastic state, we must include not only the accuracy of her credences, but also the accuracy of her full beliefs. However, if this is the case, there is a problem for the Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. For all the argument says, there might be non-probabilistic credences such that there is no total doxastic state that accuracy-dominates the total doxastic state to which those credences belong.

    Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy

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    Rights statement: Published in Philosophers' Imprint by Michigan Press. Available via: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0015.016.

    Final published version, 214 KB, PDF document

    Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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