Accuracy-first epistemology without Additivity

Richard G Pettigrew

Accuracy-first epistemology without Additivity

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

Abstract

Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, Additivity, and Strict Propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming Additivity.

Original language	English
Journal	Philosophy of Science
Publication status	Accepted/In press - 1 Feb 2021

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JO - Philosophy of Science

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