Accuracy-first epistemology without Additivity

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Abstract

Accuracy arguments for the core tenets of Bayesian epistemology differ mainly in the conditions they place on the legitimate ways of measuring the inaccuracy of our credences. The best existing arguments rely on three conditions: Continuity, Additivity, and Strict Propriety. In this paper, I show how to strengthen the arguments based on these conditions by showing that the central mathematical theorem on which each depends goes through without assuming Additivity.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)128-151
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume89
Issue number1
Early online date31 Jan 2022
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 31 Jan 2022

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