Skip to content

Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Original languageEnglish
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
DateAccepted/In press - 8 Jan 2020

Abstract

Philosophers have recently attempted to justify particular belief revision procedures by arguing that they are the optimal means towards the epistemic end of accurate credences. These attempts, however, presuppose that means should be evaluated according to classical expected utility theory; and there is a long tradition maintaining that expected utility theory is too restrictive as a theory of means-end rationality, ruling out too many natural ways of taking risk into account. In this paper, we investigate what belief-revision procedures are supported by accuracy-theoretic considerations once we depart from expected utility theory to allow agents to be risk-sensitive. We argue that, if accuracy-theoretic considerations tell risk-sensitive agents anything about belief-revision,
they tell them the same thing they tell risk-neutral agents: they should conditionalize.

    Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy

Documents

Documents

  • Full-text PDF (accepted author manuscript)

    Accepted author manuscript, 472 KB, PDF document

    Embargo ends: 1/01/99

    Request copy

View research connections

Related faculties, schools or groups