Against Leben's Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles

Geoff Keeling

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter in a book


Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where (i) causing harm to at least one person is unavoidable or very likely; and (ii) a choice about how to allocate harms between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben's answer.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence
EditorsVincent C Müller
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2018

Publication series



  • Autonomous vehicles
  • Robot Ethics
  • John Rawls
  • Political Philosophy
  • Ethics of Harm
  • Artificial Intelligence


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