Abstract
In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and then aggregate? Or should we try to do both at once? And when do these different procedures agree with one another? In this paper, we focus particularly on the final question.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 40 |
Journal | Synthese |
Early online date | 16 Nov 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 16 Nov 2017 |
Structured keywords
- Centre for Science and Philosophy
Keywords
- Accuracy
- Bayesian Epistemology
- Judgment aggregation
- Probabilistic Opinion Pooling