Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree

Richard Pettigrew

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1613-7

Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree

Richard Pettigrew^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

310 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and then aggregate? Or should we try to do both at once? And when do these different procedures agree with one another? In this paper, we focus particularly on the final question.

Original language	English
Number of pages	40
Journal	Synthese
Early online date	16 Nov 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1613-7
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 16 Nov 2017

Structured keywords

Centre for Science and Philosophy

Keywords

Accuracy
Bayesian Epistemology
Judgment aggregation
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling

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10.1007/s11229-017-1613-7

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Cite this

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AB - In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and then aggregate? Or should we try to do both at once? And when do these different procedures agree with one another? In this paper, we focus particularly on the final question.

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ER -

Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree

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