Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree

Richard Pettigrew*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
362 Downloads (Pure)


In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and then aggregate? Or should we try to do both at once? And when do these different procedures agree with one another? In this paper, we focus particularly on the final question.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages40
Early online date16 Nov 2017
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 16 Nov 2017

Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy


  • Accuracy
  • Bayesian Epistemology
  • Judgment aggregation
  • Probabilistic Opinion Pooling


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