Alliances and negotiations

Paola Manzini*, Marco Mariotti

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)


Negotiations often occur not between individuals but among groups (companies, trade unions, political parties, etc.) each representing composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances. We formalise the notion of 'alliance' and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the alliance affect the bargaining outcome. In particular, we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' negotiating tactics than majority procedures.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)128-141
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2005

Bibliographical note

Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.


  • Alliances
  • Multiperson bargaining

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