Alliances and negotiations: An incomplete information example

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


We study a bargaining game between an individual and an 'alliance' in the sense of Manzini and Mariotti (J Econ Theory 121:128-41, 2005), in which the opponent of the alliance is incompletely informed about the relative strengths of its members. The best equilibrium outcome for the alliance under a unanimity rule is not attainable with a non-unanimity rule. However, unlike in the complete information model, less than optimal outcomes and delays may occur with positive probability even under unanimity, depending on the prior beliefs and the preferences of the agents.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)195-203
Number of pages9
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2009

Bibliographical note

Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Structured keywords

  • ECON Microeconomic Theory


  • Alliances
  • Incomplete information
  • Multiperson bargaining
  • Voting procedures


Dive into the research topics of 'Alliances and negotiations: An incomplete information example'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this