An Ambiguity Aversion Framework of Security Game under Ambiguities

WenJun Ma, Xudong Luo, Weiru Liu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

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Security is a critical concern around the world. Since resources for security are always limited, lots of interest have arisen in using game theory to handle security resource allocation problems. However, most of the existing work does not address adequately how a defender chooses his optimal strategy in a game with absent, inaccurate, uncertain, and even ambiguous strategy profiles’ payoffs. To address this issue, we propose a general framework of security games under ambiguities based on Dempster-Shafer theory and the ambiguity aversion principle of minimax regret. Then, we reveal some properties of this framework. Also, we present two methods to reduce the influence of complete ignorance. Our investigation shows that this new framework is better in handling security resource allocation problems under ambiguities.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
EditorsFrancesca Rossi
PublisherAAAI Press
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781577356332
Publication statusPublished - 15 May 2014


  • Terrorism Prevention
  • Security Game
  • Game Theory
  • Uncertainty
  • D-S Theory
  • Ambiguity
  • Decision Making
  • Agent


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