An Analysis of Goubin's Refined Power Analysis Attack

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

Abstract

Power analysis attacks on elliptic curve based systems work by analysing the point multiplication algorithm. Recently Goubin observed that if an attacker can choose the point $P$ to enter into the point multiplication algorithm then none of the standard three randomizations can fully defend against a DPA attack. In this paper we examine Goubin's attack in more detail and completely discount its effectiveness when the attacker chooses a point of finite order, for the remaining cases we propose a defence based on using isogenies of small degree.
Translated title of the contributionAn Analysis of Goubin's Refined Power Analysis Attack
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2003
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages281 - 290
Number of pages9
Volume2779
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2003

Bibliographical note

Conference Proceedings/Title of Journal: Proceedings CHES 2003

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