Abstract
Power analysis attacks on elliptic curve based systems
work by analysing the point multiplication algorithm.
Recently Goubin observed that if an
attacker can choose the point $P$ to enter into the point
multiplication algorithm then none of the standard
three randomizations can fully defend against a DPA attack.
In this paper we examine Goubin's attack in more detail and
completely discount its effectiveness when the attacker chooses
a point of finite order,
for the remaining cases we propose a defence based on using
isogenies of small degree.
| Translated title of the contribution | An Analysis of Goubin's Refined Power Analysis Attack |
|---|---|
| Original language | English |
| Title of host publication | Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2003 |
| Publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| Pages | 281 - 290 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Volume | 2779 |
| Publication status | Published - Sep 2003 |