An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy

L Quaglia

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

    16 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This article proposes a three-tier framework for analysing the politics of central bank independence. International factors explain the general trend towards central bank independence. However, they are framed differently by various national systems. At the national level, for heuristic purposes, the analysis can be structured by focusing on 'suppliers' and 'demanders' of central bank independence. The former are the political authorities, whereas the latter are socioeconomic forces and interest groups, with the central bank positioned in-between. At the micro-institutional level, central banks can be influential economic and political actors situated at the interface between levels of governance. The added value of this integrated framework is appraised using one case study, the Bank of Italy's path to independence, which is compared with the experience of the Bank of England and the Bundesbank. In contrast to many works on central bank independence, the methodology adopted here is qualitative, rather than quantitative, and is grounded in empirical research.
    Translated title of the contributionAn Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)549 - 568
    Number of pages20
    JournalWEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
    Volume28 (3)
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - May 2005

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher: Routledge

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