Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

David S. Ahn, Santiago Oliveros

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)304-310
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2016

Structured keywords

  • ECON Microeconomic Theory
  • Political Economy
  • Voting


  • Approval voting
  • Information aggregation
  • Plurality rule
  • Scoring rule


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