Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

David S. Ahn; Santiago Oliveros

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002

Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

David S. Ahn, Santiago Oliveros

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	304-310
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	166
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002
Publication status	Published - 1 Nov 2016

Structured keywords

ECON Microeconomic Theory
Political Economy
Voting

Keywords

Approval voting
Information aggregation
Plurality rule
Scoring rule

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10.1016/j.jet.2016.09.002

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Dr Santiago Oliveros
- s.oliveros@bristol.ac.uk
- School of Economics - Professor of Economics
Person: Academic

Cite this

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AB - We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well.

KW - Approval voting

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Plurality rule

KW - Scoring rule

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Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

Abstract

Structured keywords

Keywords

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Dr Santiago Oliveros

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