Abstract
This paper deals with the effects that intermediation has on strategic behaviour in negotiations. To this end, we use the tools of game theory to analyse how different institutional settings can provide specific strategic incentives and thereby condition the outcome of negotiations. We concentrate on some very recent contributions, which have addressed gaps in this literature and stress the economic intuition behind some predicted behaviours.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 629-648 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | European Business Organization Law Review |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 28 Sept 2002 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2002, T.M.C. Asser Press.
Copyright:
Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.