Arbitration and Mediation: An Economic Perspective

Paola Manzini; Marco Mariotti

doi:10.1017/S1566752900001087

Arbitration and Mediation: An Economic Perspective

Paola Manzini^*, Marco Mariotti

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

Abstract

This paper deals with the effects that intermediation has on strategic behaviour in negotiations. To this end, we use the tools of game theory to analyse how different institutional settings can provide specific strategic incentives and thereby condition the outcome of negotiations. We concentrate on some very recent contributions, which have addressed gaps in this literature and stress the economic intuition behind some predicted behaviours.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	629-648
Number of pages	20
Journal	European Business Organization Law Review
Volume	3
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752900001087
Publication status	Published - 28 Sep 2002

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2002, T.M.C. Asser Press.

Copyright:
Copyright 2015 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

Access to Document

10.1017/S1566752900001087

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