'Aristotle and the Cognitive Component of Emotions'

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter provides arguments regarding Aristotle’s insights into the cognitive component of emotions. More specifically, it argues that Aristotle believed that a variety of psychological states can grasp the cognitive content involved in emotions. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of this view, the chapter presents a debate concerning whether Aristotle advocates a phantasia-based account of emotions, according to which emotions are some kind of perceptual construal or imagining, or whether he is instead best thought of as holding some kind of belief-based view. In fact, the chapter contends that both interpretations are in the wrong. Hence, the chapter advances its own view by first providing a sketch of some of the key points in the debate before reconsidering Aristotle’s view.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)165-211
Number of pages47
JournalOxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy
Volume46
Issue number0
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 12 Jun 2014

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