Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

Guy Barwell; Daniel Martin; Elisabeth Oswald; Martijn Stam

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24

Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

Guy Barwell, Daniel Martin, Elisabeth Oswald, Martijn Stam

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

36 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017
Subtitle of host publication	23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I
Publisher	Springer
Pages	693-723
Number of pages	31
ISBN (Electronic)	9783319706948
ISBN (Print)	9783319706931
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24
Publication status	Published - 30 Nov 2017

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Volume	10624
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743

Keywords

secret-key cryptography/provable security
authenticated encryption
generic composition
leakage resilience
robustness

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24Licence: Unspecified

https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/068Licence: CC BY

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Persistent link

Side channel aware software design flow
Page, D. (Principal Investigator)
1/01/16 → 31/12/20
Project: Research
SILENT: Rework of Side channels-theory and implications for society
Oswald, M. E. (Principal Investigator)
1/01/11 → 1/04/16
Project: Research

Cite this

Barwell, G., Martin, D., Oswald, E., & Stam, M. (2017). Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage. In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017: 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I (pp. 693-723). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10624). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24

Barwell, Guy ; Martin, Daniel ; Oswald, Elisabeth et al. / Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage. Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017: 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I. Springer, 2017. pp. 693-723 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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abstract = "Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.",

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Barwell, G, Martin, D, Oswald, E & Stam, M 2017, Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage. in Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017: 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10624, Springer, pp. 693-723. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24

Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage. / Barwell, Guy; Martin, Daniel; Oswald, Elisabeth et al.
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017: 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I. Springer, 2017. p. 693-723 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 10624).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

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N2 - Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.

AB - Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.

KW - secret-key cryptography/provable security

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KW - leakage resilience

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Barwell G, Martin D, Oswald E, Stam M. Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage. In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017: 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I. Springer. 2017. p. 693-723. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-70694-8_24

Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

Access to Document

Handle.net

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Projects

Side channel aware software design flow

SILENT: Rework of Side channels-theory and implications for society

Cite this