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Authenticated Encryption in the Face of Protocol and Side Channel Leakage

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

  • Guy Barwell
  • Daniel Martin
  • Elisabeth Oswald
  • Martijn Stam
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017
Subtitle of host publication23rd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I
Publisher or commissioning bodySpringer
Pages693-723
Number of pages31
ISBN (Electronic)9783319706948
ISBN (Print)9783319706931
DOIs
DateAccepted/In press - 14 Aug 2017
DatePublished (current) - 30 Nov 2017

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
Volume10624
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Abstract

Authenticated encryption schemes in practice have to be robust against adversaries that have access to various types of leakage, for instance decryption leakage on invalid ciphertexts (protocol leakage), or leakage on the underlying primitives (side channel leakage). This work includes several novel contributions: we augment the notion of nonce-base authenticated encryption with the notion of continuous leakage and we prove composition results in the face of protocol and side channel leakage. Moreover, we show how to achieve authenticated encryption that is simultaneously both misuse resistant and leakage resilient, based on a sufficiently leakage resilient PRF, and finally we propose a concrete, pairing-based instantiation of the latter.

    Research areas

  • secret-key cryptography/provable security, authenticated encryption, generic composition, leakage resilience, robustness

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