Autonomy, Nudging and Post-Truth Politics

Geoff Keeling

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

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In his excellent essay, ‘Nudges in a post-truth world’, Neil Levy argues that ‘nudges to reason’, or nudges which aim to make us more receptive to evidence, are morally permissible. A strong argument against the moral permissibility of nudging is that nudges fail to respect the autonomy of the individuals affected by them. Levy argues that nudges to reason do respect individual autonomy, such that the standard autonomy objection fails against nudges to reason. In this paper, I argue that Levy fails to show that nudges to reason respect individual autonomy.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Medical Ethics
Early online date16 Nov 2017
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 16 Nov 2017


  • Nudging
  • Political Science
  • Rational Choice
  • Public Policy
  • Ethics


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