Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence

Catrin Campbell-Moore, Bernhard Salow

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)
46 Downloads (Pure)


It is natural to think that there's something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk avoidance that is both wide-spread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable.

In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic utility, or accuracy, when considering risk-avoidant agents.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)495-515
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number3
Early online date13 Mar 2020
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 13 Mar 2020

Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy


  • risk aversion
  • value of information
  • epistemic utility theory
  • accuracy


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