Abstract
It is natural to think that there's something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk avoidance that is both wide-spread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable.
In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic utility, or accuracy, when considering risk-avoidant agents.
In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic utility, or accuracy, when considering risk-avoidant agents.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 495-515 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 98 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 13 Mar 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 13 Mar 2020 |
Structured keywords
- Centre for Science and Philosophy
Keywords
- risk aversion
- value of information
- epistemic utility theory
- accuracy
