Abstract
Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (more transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist's disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: if market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 2834-2859 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue number | 7 |
| Early online date | 31 Jan 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 31 Jan 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.
Research Groups and Themes
- AF Corporate Finance
- AF Financial Markets
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Dr Guillem Ordonez-Calafi
- University of Bristol Business School - Senior Lecturer in Finance
Person: Academic