Blockholder Disclosure Thresholds and Hedge Fund Activism

Guillem Ordonez-Calafi*, Dan Bernhardt

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

    2 Citations (Scopus)
    54 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (more transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits of the activist's disciplining of management. Conversely, activists may desire disclosure thresholds if the threat of their participation discourages managerial malfeasance, which is their source of profits. Hedge fund activism can be excessive: if market opacity sufficiently harms uninformed investors, the costs of reduced real investment outweigh the social benefits from managerial disciplining, and society benefits from lower thresholds.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)2834-2859
    Number of pages26
    JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
    Volume57
    Issue number7
    Early online date31 Jan 2022
    DOIs
    Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 31 Jan 2022

    Bibliographical note

    Publisher Copyright:
    © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington.

    Research Groups and Themes

    • AF Corporate Finance
    • AF Financial Markets

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