Choice with Affirmative Action

Battal Dogan, Kemal Yildiz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
78 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

A choice rule with affirmative action decides on the recipients of a limited number of identical objects by reconciling two objectives: respecting a priority ordering over the applicants and supporting a minority group. We extend the standard formulation of a choice problem by incorporating a type function and a priority ordering and introduce monotonicity axioms on how a choice rule should respond to variations in these parameters. We show that monotonic and substitutable affirmative action rules are the ones that admit a bounded reserve representation. As a prominent class of choice rules that satisfy the monotonicity axioms, we characterize lexicographic affirmative action rules that are prevalent both in the literature and in practice. Our axiomatic approach provides a novel way to think about reserve systems and uncovers choice rules that go beyond lexicographic affirmative action rules.
Original languageEnglish
JournalManagement Science
Early online date8 Jun 2022
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 8 Jun 2022

Keywords

  • Affirmative action
  • bounded reserve representation
  • lexicographic choice

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