Citizen candidates under uncertainty

Jon X. Eguia

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y

Citizen candidates under uncertainty

Jon X. Eguia^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I add uncertainty about the total vote count to a "citizen candidate" model of representative democracy. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	317-331
Number of pages	15
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	29
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y
Publication status	Published - Sept 2007

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PREFERENCES

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AB - In this paper I add uncertainty about the total vote count to a "citizen candidate" model of representative democracy. I show that in a society with a large electorate, where the outcome of the election is uncertain and where winning candidates receive a large reward from holding office, there will be a two-candidate equilibrium and no equilibria with a single candidate.

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KW - PREFERENCES

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DO - 10.1007/s00355-006-0207-y

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

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VL - 29

SP - 317

EP - 331

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

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Citizen candidates under uncertainty

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