Collective Hold-Up

Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros

Research output: Working paperWorking paper and Preprints

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Abstract

We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics and politics, including a lobbyist seeking to pass a bill, an entrepreneur setting up a start-up, or a firm seeking the approval of corrupt bureaucrats. We show that when the principal’s willingness to pay is high, strengthening the bargaining position of the agents generates delay and reduces agents’ welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents prefer to give up considerable bargaining power in favor of the principal.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages45
Publication statusUnpublished - 1 May 2019

Structured keywords

  • ECON Microeconomic Theory
  • Political Economy
  • Contract Theory

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