Common Ownership of Public Goods

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka; Evagelos Pafilis

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002

Common Ownership of Public Goods

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka, Evagelos Pafilis

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	555-578
Number of pages	24
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	180
Early online date	13 Nov 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2020

Structured keywords

ECON Microeconomic Theory

Keywords

public goods
common pool resources
property right theory
relational contracts
common ownership
joint ownership

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10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002

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This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online via Elsevier at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726812030370X . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
Accepted author manuscript, 432 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

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Dr Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka
- Maija.Halonenbristol.acuk
- School of Economics - Associate Professor
- Centre for Market and Public Organisation
Person: Academic , Member

Cite this

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title = "Common Ownership of Public Goods",

abstract = "We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner{\textquoteright}s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom{\textquoteright}s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.",

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author = "Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and Evagelos Pafilis",

year = "2020",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Common Ownership of Public Goods

AU - Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija

AU - Pafilis, Evagelos

PY - 2020/12/1

Y1 - 2020/12/1

N2 - We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.

AB - We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.

KW - public goods

KW - common pool resources

KW - property right theory

KW - relational contracts

KW - common ownership

KW - joint ownership

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.10.002

M3 - Article (Academic Journal)

VL - 180

SP - 555

EP - 578

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -

Common Ownership of Public Goods

Abstract

Structured keywords

Keywords

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Dr Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka

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