Abstract
We analyze ownership of public goods in a repeated game focusing on common ownership. Under common ownership an owner’s access to the public good cannot be restricted by other owners. We find that under common ownership both the value of the relationship and the gain from deviation are high. Common ownership can provide the best incentives for cooperation when the value of the public good cannot be increased much by maintenance investments or the maintenance costs are sufficiently convex. We argue that these conditions are satisfied in Ostrom’s field studies of irrigation systems and common lands.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 4 Oct 2020 |
Structured keywords
- ECON Microeconomic Theory
Keywords
- public goods
- common pool resources
- property right theory
- relational contracts
- common ownership
- joint ownership
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Profiles
Dr Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka
- School of Economics - Senior Lecturer in Economics
- Centre for Market and Public Organisation
Person: Academic , Member
Cite this
Halonen-Akatwijuka, M., & Pafilis, E. (Accepted/In press). Common Ownership of Public Goods. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.