Competing for loyalty: The dynamics of rallying support

Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. We show that competition reduces agents' welfare with public goods, or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents, and increases agents' welfare with public bads. We apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers, vote buying, and exclusive deals.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2990-3005
Number of pages16
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume107
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2017

Bibliographical note

Proxy date of acceptance added to output record.

Structured keywords

  • ECON Microeconomic Theory
  • Political Economy
  • Contract Theory

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