Congestion pricing and non-cooperative games in communication networks

AJ Ganesh, K Laevens, R Steinberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider congestion pricing as a mechanism for sharing bandwidth in communication networks, and model the interaction among the users as a game. We propose a decentralized algorithm for the users that is based on the history of the price process, where user response to congestion prices is analogous to "fictitious play" in game theory, and show that this results in convergence to the unique Wardrop equilibrium. We further show that the Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the welfare-maximizing capacity allocation.
Translated title of the contributionCongestion pricing and non-cooperative games in communication networks
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)430 - 438
Number of pages9
JournalOperations Research
Volume55 (3)
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2007

Bibliographical note

Publisher: Informs

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