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Consequentialism and the separateness of persons

  • Jessica j t Fischer*
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

Abstract

It is often said that consequentialism violates the separateness of persons. But what does this mean? Existing interpretations are often unclear, or let consequentialism off easy: because they target amendable parts of the consequentialist framework, they can be sidestepped by more subtle versions of the theory. Consequentialism's opponents, however, might hope for a stronger interpretation––one which suggests that the separateness of persons objection presses a distinct and powerful charge against consequentialist theory. This paper proposes such an interpretation. It starts from the fact that, unlike other moral theories, consequentialism determines how to act by looking at features such as states of affairs or outcomes. Yet, crucially, states of affairs or outcomes often make reference to, or extend across, more than one person. Thus, they implicitly and necessarily group together different individuals. In the proposal of this paper, it is this part of consequentialism which violates the separateness of persons.
Original languageEnglish
Article numberpqae148
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Early online date12 Dec 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 12 Dec 2024

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