Abstract
We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 125-137 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Economic Theory Bulletin |
Volume | 8 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 11 Jun 2019 |
Structured keywords
- ECON Microeconomic Theory
- ECON CEPS Education
Keywords
- market design
- school choice
- consistency
- weak consistency
- EADAM