Consistent Pareto Improvement Over the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism

Battal Doğan, M. Bumin Yenmez

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Abstract

We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)125-137
Number of pages13
JournalEconomic Theory Bulletin
Volume8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 Jun 2019

Structured keywords

  • ECON Microeconomic Theory
  • ECON CEPS Education

Keywords

  • market design
  • school choice
  • consistency
  • weak consistency
  • EADAM

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    This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Springer Nature at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6#:~:text=We%20introduce%20the%20following%20weakly,then%20the%20assignments%20of%20the . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.

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