Consistent Pareto Improvement Over the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism

Battal Doğan; M. Bumin Yenmez

doi:10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6

Consistent Pareto Improvement Over the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism

Battal Doğan, M. Bumin Yenmez

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article (Academic Journal) › peer-review

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Abstract

We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	125-137
Number of pages	13
Journal	Economic Theory Bulletin
Volume	8
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6
Publication status	Published - 11 Jun 2019

Structured keywords

ECON Microeconomic Theory
ECON CEPS Education

Keywords

market design
school choice
consistency
weak consistency
EADAM

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10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6

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Cite this

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abstract = "We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.",

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AU - Yenmez, M. Bumin

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N2 - We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.

AB - We show that there is no consistent Pareto improvement over any stable mechanism. We introduce the following weakly consistent Pareto improvement (over the student-optimal stable matching) requirement: whenever a set of students, each of whom is assigned to a school that is underdemanded at the student-optimal stable matching, is removed with their assigned seats, then the assignments of the remaining students do not change. Our main result is that the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (Kesten in Q J Econ 125(3):1297–1348, 2010) is the unique weakly consistent Pareto improvement over the student-optimal stable mechanism.

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KW - school choice

KW - consistency

KW - weak consistency

KW - EADAM

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EP - 137

JO - Economic Theory Bulletin

JF - Economic Theory Bulletin

SN - 2196-1085

ER -

Consistent Pareto Improvement Over the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism

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Keywords

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