Core equivalence theorem with production

Siyang Xiong, Charles Zhoucheng Zheng*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In production economies, the extent to which non-equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders, because a blocking coalition's resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders. We formulate a notion of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account, and we prove an analog of the Debreu-Scarf theorem for replica production economies. Our theorem differs from theirs in using an additional assumption, which we argue is indispensable and is driven by the interdependency problem. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)246-270
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume137
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2007

Keywords

  • core equivalence
  • production
  • core
  • coalition
  • blocking
  • ECONOMY
  • MARKET
  • CLUBS

Cite this