Corruption and power in democracies

Francesco Giovannoni, Daniel J. Seidmann*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the implications of Acton's dictum that power corrupts when citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. Our model entails various plausible predictions about long-run patterns of government. Acton's dictum results in possible government turnover, and in different predictions about possible government composition: for example, that the grand coalition may form.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)707-734
Number of pages28
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume42
Issue number3
Early online date9 May 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014

Keywords

  • GOVERNMENT FORMATION
  • ACCOUNTABILITY
  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • POLITICIANS
  • ELECTIONS
  • AUDITS

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