Projects per year
Abstract
Side channels provide additional information to skilled adversaries that reduce the effort to determine an unknown key. If sufficient side channel information is available, identification of the secret key can even become trivial. However, if not enough side information is available, some effort is still required to find the key in the key space (which now has reduced entropy). To understand the security implications of side channel attacks it is then crucial to evaluate this remaining effort in a meaningful manner. Quantifying this effort can be done by looking at two key questions: first, how `deep' (at most) is the unknown key in the remaining key space, and second, how `expensive' is it to enumerate keys up to a certain depth?
We provide results for these two challenges. Firstly, we show how to construct an extremely efficient algorithm that accurately computes the rank of a (known) key in the list of all keys, when ordered according to some side channel attack scores. Secondly, we show how our approach can be tweaked such that it can be also utilised to enumerate the most likely keys in a parallel fashion. We are hence the first to demonstrate that a smart and parallel key enumeration algorithm exists.
We provide results for these two challenges. Firstly, we show how to construct an extremely efficient algorithm that accurately computes the rank of a (known) key in the list of all keys, when ordered according to some side channel attack scores. Secondly, we show how our approach can be tweaked such that it can be also utilised to enumerate the most likely keys in a parallel fashion. We are hence the first to demonstrate that a smart and parallel key enumeration algorithm exists.
Original language  English 

Title of host publication  Advances in Cryptology  ASIACRYPT 2015 
Subtitle of host publication  21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Auckland, New Zealand, November 29  December 3, 2015, Proceedings, Part II 
Editors  Tetsu Iwata, Jung Hee Cheon 
Publisher  Springer 
Pages  313337 
Number of pages  25 
Volume  9453 
ISBN (Electronic)  9783662488003 
ISBN (Print)  9783662487990 
DOIs  
Publication status  Published  30 Dec 2015 
Publication series
Name  Lecture Notes in Computer Science 

Publisher  Springer 
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Projects
 1 Finished

SILENT: Rework of Side channelstheory and implications for society
Oswald, M. E.
1/01/11 → 1/04/16
Project: Research
Equipment

HPC (High Performance Computing) facility
Caroline E Gardiner (Manager)
IT ServicesFacility/equipment: Facility