Projects per year

### Abstract

Side channels provide additional information to skilled adversaries that reduce the effort to determine an unknown key. If sufficient side channel information is available, identification of the secret key can even become trivial. However, if not enough side information is available, some effort is still required to find the key in the key space (which now has reduced entropy). To understand the security implications of side channel attacks it is then crucial to evaluate this remaining effort in a meaningful manner. Quantifying this effort can be done by looking at two key questions: first, how `deep' (at most) is the unknown key in the remaining key space, and second, how `expensive' is it to enumerate keys up to a certain depth?

We provide results for these two challenges. Firstly, we show how to construct an extremely efficient algorithm that accurately computes the rank of a (known) key in the list of all keys, when ordered according to some side channel attack scores. Secondly, we show how our approach can be tweaked such that it can be also utilised to enumerate the most likely keys in a parallel fashion. We are hence the first to demonstrate that a smart and parallel key enumeration algorithm exists.

We provide results for these two challenges. Firstly, we show how to construct an extremely efficient algorithm that accurately computes the rank of a (known) key in the list of all keys, when ordered according to some side channel attack scores. Secondly, we show how our approach can be tweaked such that it can be also utilised to enumerate the most likely keys in a parallel fashion. We are hence the first to demonstrate that a smart and parallel key enumeration algorithm exists.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015 |

Subtitle of host publication | 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Auckland, New Zealand, November 29 -- December 3, 2015, Proceedings, Part II |

Editors | Tetsu Iwata, Jung Hee Cheon |

Publisher | Springer |

Pages | 313-337 |

Volume | 9453 |

ISBN (Print) | 978-3-662-48799-0 |

DOIs | |

Publication status | Published - Dec 2015 |

### Publication series

Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
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Publisher | Springer |

## Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Counting Keys in Parallel After a Side Channel Attack'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

## Projects

- 1 Finished

## SILENT: Rework of Side channels-theory and implications for society

Oswald, M. E.

1/01/11 → 1/04/16

Project: Research

## Cite this

Martin, D., O'Connell, J., Oswald, E., & Stam, M. (2015). Counting Keys in Parallel After a Side Channel Attack. In T. Iwata, & J. H. Cheon (Eds.),

*Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2015: 21st International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Auckland, New Zealand, November 29 -- December 3, 2015, Proceedings, Part II*(Vol. 9453, pp. 313-337). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_13