Deference Done Right

Richard G Pettigrew, Michael G Titelbaum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)
234 Downloads (Pure)


There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential (or logical) probabilities. But exactly what constraint does a deference requirement place on an agent's credences? In this paper we consider three answers, inspired by three principles that have been proposed for deference to objective chances. We consider how these options fare when applied to the other kinds of epistemic experts mentioned above. Of the three deference principles we consider, we argue that two of the options face insuperable difficulties. The third, on the other hand, fares well|at least when it is applied in a particular way.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophers' Imprint
Issue number35
Publication statusPublished - 2014


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