Abstract
The conservativeness argument poses a dilemma to deflationism about truth.
The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that this formal setting actually conflicts with certain assumptions upon which the conservativeness argument relies. My proposal is that the appropriate setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is rather provided by theories of truth over subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting not only provides deflationists with better defence, but also brings a broader perspective to the debate.
The debate on the conservativeness argument has so far been framed in a specific formal setting, where theories of truth are formulated over arithmetical base theories. I will argue that this formal setting actually conflicts with certain assumptions upon which the conservativeness argument relies. My proposal is that the appropriate setting for evaluating the conservativeness argument is rather provided by theories of truth over subject matters ‘richer’ than arithmetic, such as set theory. The move to this new formal setting not only provides deflationists with better defence, but also brings a broader perspective to the debate.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1045-1069 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Synthese |
| Volume | 196 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 17 Aug 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 15 Mar 2019 |
Keywords
- Axiomatic theories of truth
- Deflationism
- The conservativeness argument
- Truth
