Does Semantic Deflationism Entail Meta-Ontological Deflationism?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)peer-review


Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how they relate to each other. Are they independent, is it advisable to hold them all at once, or do they even entail each other? One exception is Amie Thomasson, who has argued that semantic deflationism actually entails meta-ontological deflationism. This is unexpected, since semantic deflationism is usually regarded as much less controversial than meta-ontological deflationism. In our paper, we will argue that Thomasson’s argument fails though, and that the connection between the views is in fact weaker than she makes them out to be.
Original languageEnglish
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number99-119
Publication statusPublished - 29 May 2020


Dive into the research topics of 'Does Semantic Deflationism Entail Meta-Ontological Deflationism?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this