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Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ

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Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ. / Lindell, Yehuda; Pinkas, Benny; Smart, Nigel P.; Yanai, Avishay.

In: Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 32, No. 3, 15.07.2019, p. 1026-1069.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Lindell, Y, Pinkas, B, Smart, NP & Yanai, A 2019, 'Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ', Journal of Cryptology, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 1026-1069. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2

APA

Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B., Smart, N. P., & Yanai, A. (2019). Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ. Journal of Cryptology, 32(3), 1026-1069. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2

Vancouver

Lindell Y, Pinkas B, Smart NP, Yanai A. Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ. Journal of Cryptology. 2019 Jul 15;32(3):1026-1069. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2

Author

Lindell, Yehuda ; Pinkas, Benny ; Smart, Nigel P. ; Yanai, Avishay. / Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ. In: Journal of Cryptology. 2019 ; Vol. 32, No. 3. pp. 1026-1069.

Bibtex

@article{38860aea6e9b440eb2c84194ca26b486,
title = "Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ",
abstract = "Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation, even while providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries. This is especially the case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over slow networks. However, in the multi-party setting, all concretely efficient fully secure protocols, such as SPDZ, require many rounds of communication. In this paper, we present a constant-round multi-party secure computation protocol that is fully secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and for any number of corrupted parties. Our construction is based on the constant-round protocol of Beaver et al. (the BMR protocol) and is the first version of that protocol that is concretely efficient for the dishonest majority case. Our protocol includes an online phase that is extremely fast and mainly consists of each party locally evaluating a garbled circuit. For the offline phase, we present both a generic construction (using any underlying MPC protocol) and a highly efficient instantiation based on the SPDZ protocol. Our estimates show the protocol to be considerably more efficient than previous fully secure multi-party protocols.",
keywords = "BMR, Concrete efficiency, Garbled circuits, Secure multiparty computation (MPC), SPDZ",
author = "Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas and Smart, {Nigel P.} and Avishay Yanai",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
day = "15",
doi = "10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "1026--1069",
journal = "Journal of Cryptology",
issn = "0933-2790",
publisher = "Springer US",
number = "3",

}

RIS - suitable for import to EndNote

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ

AU - Lindell, Yehuda

AU - Pinkas, Benny

AU - Smart, Nigel P.

AU - Yanai, Avishay

PY - 2019/7/15

Y1 - 2019/7/15

N2 - Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation, even while providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries. This is especially the case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over slow networks. However, in the multi-party setting, all concretely efficient fully secure protocols, such as SPDZ, require many rounds of communication. In this paper, we present a constant-round multi-party secure computation protocol that is fully secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and for any number of corrupted parties. Our construction is based on the constant-round protocol of Beaver et al. (the BMR protocol) and is the first version of that protocol that is concretely efficient for the dishonest majority case. Our protocol includes an online phase that is extremely fast and mainly consists of each party locally evaluating a garbled circuit. For the offline phase, we present both a generic construction (using any underlying MPC protocol) and a highly efficient instantiation based on the SPDZ protocol. Our estimates show the protocol to be considerably more efficient than previous fully secure multi-party protocols.

AB - Recently, there has been huge progress in the field of concretely efficient secure computation, even while providing security in the presence of malicious adversaries. This is especially the case in the two-party setting, where constant-round protocols exist that remain fast even over slow networks. However, in the multi-party setting, all concretely efficient fully secure protocols, such as SPDZ, require many rounds of communication. In this paper, we present a constant-round multi-party secure computation protocol that is fully secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and for any number of corrupted parties. Our construction is based on the constant-round protocol of Beaver et al. (the BMR protocol) and is the first version of that protocol that is concretely efficient for the dishonest majority case. Our protocol includes an online phase that is extremely fast and mainly consists of each party locally evaluating a garbled circuit. For the offline phase, we present both a generic construction (using any underlying MPC protocol) and a highly efficient instantiation based on the SPDZ protocol. Our estimates show the protocol to be considerably more efficient than previous fully secure multi-party protocols.

KW - BMR

KW - Concrete efficiency

KW - Garbled circuits

KW - Secure multiparty computation (MPC)

KW - SPDZ

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065130359&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2

DO - 10.1007/s00145-019-09322-2

M3 - Article

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VL - 32

SP - 1026

EP - 1069

JO - Journal of Cryptology

JF - Journal of Cryptology

SN - 0933-2790

IS - 3

ER -