Embodied Decisions and the Predictive Brain

Christopher Burr

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter in a book

Abstract

A cognitivist account of decision-making views choice behaviour as a serial process of deliberation and commitment, which is separate from perception and action. By contrast, recent work in embodied decision-making has argued that this account is incompatible with emerging neurophysiological data. We argue that this account has significant overlap with an embodied account of predictive processing, and that both can offer mutual development for the other. However, more importantly, by demonstrating this close connection we uncover an alternative perspective on the nature of decision-making, and the mechanisms that underlie our choice behaviour. This alternative perspective allows us to respond to a challenge for predictive processing, which claims that the satisfaction of distal goal-states is underspecified. Answering this challenge requires the adoption of an embodied perspective.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophy and Predictive Processing
EditorsThomas Metzinger, Wanja Wiese
PublisherMIND Group
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

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    Burr, C. (2017). Embodied Decisions and the Predictive Brain. In T. Metzinger, & W. Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing MIND Group. https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958573086