Endogenous Parties in an Assembly

Jon X. Eguia*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle (Academic Journal)

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)16-26
Number of pages11
JournalAmerican Journal of Political Science
Volume55
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2011

Keywords

  • EQUILIBRIUM
  • INSTITUTIONS
  • COALITION
  • SYSTEMS
  • MODEL
  • GAME

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