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Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism

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Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. / Spicer, FNC.

In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 72 (2), 03.2006, p. 366 - 385.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Spicer, FNC 2006, 'Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 72 (2), pp. 366 - 385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x

APA

Spicer, FNC. (2006). Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72 (2), 366 - 385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x

Vancouver

Spicer FNC. Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2006 Mar;72 (2):366 - 385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x

Author

Spicer, FNC. / Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2006 ; Vol. 72 (2). pp. 366 - 385.

Bibtex

@article{9152aa66a1694ca894affac703f3d0ab,
title = "Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism",
abstract = "In this paper I examine the way appeals to pretheoretic intuition are used to support epistemological theses in general and the thesis of epistemic contextualism in particular. After outlining the sceptical puzzle and the contextualist's resolution of that puzzle, I explore the question of whether this solution fits better with our intuitive take on the puzzle than its invariantist rivals. I distinguish two kinds of fit a theory might have with pretheoretic intuitions-accommodation and explanation, and consider whether achieving either kind of fit would be a virtue for a theory. I then examine how contextualism could best claim to accommodate and explain our intuitions, building the best case that I can for contextualism, but concluding that there is no reason to accept contextualism either in the way it accommodates nor the way it explains our intuitions about the sceptical puzzle.",
author = "FNC Spicer",
note = "Publisher: International Phenomenological Society/Blackwell",
year = "2006",
month = "3",
doi = "10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x",
language = "English",
volume = "72 (2)",
pages = "366 -- 385",
journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
issn = "0031-8205",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS - suitable for import to EndNote

TY - JOUR

T1 - Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism

AU - Spicer, FNC

N1 - Publisher: International Phenomenological Society/Blackwell

PY - 2006/3

Y1 - 2006/3

N2 - In this paper I examine the way appeals to pretheoretic intuition are used to support epistemological theses in general and the thesis of epistemic contextualism in particular. After outlining the sceptical puzzle and the contextualist's resolution of that puzzle, I explore the question of whether this solution fits better with our intuitive take on the puzzle than its invariantist rivals. I distinguish two kinds of fit a theory might have with pretheoretic intuitions-accommodation and explanation, and consider whether achieving either kind of fit would be a virtue for a theory. I then examine how contextualism could best claim to accommodate and explain our intuitions, building the best case that I can for contextualism, but concluding that there is no reason to accept contextualism either in the way it accommodates nor the way it explains our intuitions about the sceptical puzzle.

AB - In this paper I examine the way appeals to pretheoretic intuition are used to support epistemological theses in general and the thesis of epistemic contextualism in particular. After outlining the sceptical puzzle and the contextualist's resolution of that puzzle, I explore the question of whether this solution fits better with our intuitive take on the puzzle than its invariantist rivals. I distinguish two kinds of fit a theory might have with pretheoretic intuitions-accommodation and explanation, and consider whether achieving either kind of fit would be a virtue for a theory. I then examine how contextualism could best claim to accommodate and explain our intuitions, building the best case that I can for contextualism, but concluding that there is no reason to accept contextualism either in the way it accommodates nor the way it explains our intuitions about the sceptical puzzle.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00565.x

M3 - Article

VL - 72 (2)

SP - 366

EP - 385

JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

JF - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

SN - 0031-8205

ER -