Epistemic utility and the normativity of logic

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How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of our beliefs and credences. To investigate these principles, we deploy a novel approach, namely, epistemic utility theory. That is, we assume that doxastic attitudes have different epistemic value depending on how accurately they represent the world. We then use the principles of decision theory to determine which of the putative logicrationality bridge principles we can derive from considerations of epistemic utility.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)455-492
Number of pages43
JournalLogos and Episteme
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2017

Structured keywords

  • Centre for Science and Philosophy


  • accuracy-first epistemology
  • normativity of logic
  • epistemic value


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