Abstract
We show that one can recover the PIN from a standardized RSA-based PIN encryption algorithm from a small number of queries to a ciphertext validity checking oracle. The validity checking oracle required is rather special and we discuss whether such oracles could be obtained in the real world. Our method works using a minor extension to the ideas of Bleichenbacher and Manger, in particular we obtain information from negative, as well as positive, responses from the validity checking oracle.
Translated title of the contribution | Errors Matter: Breaking RSA-Based PIN Encryption with Thirty Ciphertext Validity Queries |
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Original language | English |
Title of host publication | Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010 |
Publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
Pages | 15-25 |
Volume | 5985 |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Bibliographical note
ISBN: 9783642119248Publisher: Springer Verlag LNCS 5985
Name and Venue of Conference: Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010
Other identifier: 2001153