Evolution of realistic hybrid auctions

Qin Zengchang, T Kovacs

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Contribution (Conference Proceeding)

Abstract

Auctions are an important class of mechanisms for resolving multi-agent allocation problems. A genetic algorithm (GA) can be used to design auction mechanisms in order to automatically generate a desired market mechanism in an agent based E-market. One study found a new hybrid market mechanism never before found in the real-world which has very desirable market dynamics according to a measure based on Smith's coefficient of convergence. However, the auction space used in that study did not contain realistic single sided auctions. In this paper, a more realistic auction space is proposed and explored by a simple GA. The hybrid market mechanism can still be found which shows the hybrid market mechanism is not an artifact of an unfaithful auction space used in previous experiments.
Translated title of the contributionEvolution of realistic hybrid auctions
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationUnknown
Pages43 - 50
Number of pages7
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2004

Bibliographical note

Conference Proceedings/Title of Journal: Proceedings of the 2004 UK Workshop on Computational Intelligence (UKCI-04)

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